State of Utah v. Wallace Wayne Dean : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Wallace Wayne Dean : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Jeanne B. Inouye; assistant attorney general; David E. Doxey;
attorneys for appellee.
J. Bryan Jackson; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Dean, No. 20000340 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2740
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000340-CA 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS ENTERED UPON GUILTY PLEAS TO 
CHILD ABUSE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND CHILD ABUSE, 
A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, BOTH IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-109 (2000), AND ASSAULT, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000), IN THE FIFTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IRON COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ROBERT T. 
BRAITHWAITE PRESIDING 
JEANNE B. INOUYE (1618) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
J. BRYAN JACKSON 
J. Bryan Jackson, P.C. 
157 East Denter Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0519 
Counsel for Appellant 
DAVID E. DOXEY 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main St., Suite 1 
Cedar City, UT 84721 ^{[JzU 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Counsel for Appellee f,'QR ^ -j ?9C? 
Pauletie Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000340-CA 
vs. 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS ENTERED UPON GUILTY PLEAS TO 
CHILD ABUSE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND CHILD ABUSE, 
A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, BOTH IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-109 (2000), AND ASSAULT, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000), IN THE FIFTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IRON COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ROBERT T. 
BRAITHWAITE PRESIDING 
JEANNE B. INOUYE (1618) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
J. BRYAN JACKSON 
J. Bryan Jackson, P.C. DAVID E. DOXEY 
157 East Denter Street Deputy Iron County Attorney 
Post Office Box 519 97 North Main St., Suite 1 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0519 Cedar City, UT 84721 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA WHERE DEFENDANT'S FIRST CHALLENGE TO 
THE PLEA DID NOT ADEQUATELY IDENTIFY THE ALLEGED 
ERROR AND HIS SECOND CHALLENGE HAD NEITHER 
FACTUAL NOR LEGAL SUPPORT 
A. Defendant did not adequately identify his first claim of 
error 
B. Defendant's second challenge had neither factual nor legal 
support 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR WHEN IT 
INFORMED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY, 
BUT DID NOT USE THE MODIFIERS SPEEDY BEFORE TRIAL 
AND IMPARTIAL BEFORE JURY 
A. Defendant's claim is not properly before this Court 
1 
B. Assuming arguendo that defendant's claim is properly 
before this court, defendant has not demonstrated that the 
trial court obviously violated rule 11 and that, but for 
those violations, defendant would not have pled guilty 14 
1. No error occurred 15 
2. Error, if any, was not obvious 18 
3. Error, if any, was not harmful 19 
HI. THIS COURT MAY NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED HIM A 
CONTINUANCE AND, WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING, 
FORCED HIM TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AT SENTENCING, 
WHERE NO RECORD EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CLAIM 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (2000) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000), and 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-6(1994). 
ADDENDUM B - Preliminary Hearing (Plea-Taking) held March b 300 (R. 71) 
ADDENDUM C - Statement of the Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain filed March 8, 
2000 (R. 29-35) 
ADDENDUM D - Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea filed April 10, 2000 (R. 39-40) 
ADDENDUM E - Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw filed April 10, 
2000 (R. 41-43) 
ADDENDUM F - Motion to Strike Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea/Response to 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R. 48-52) 
ADDENDUM G - Minutes of Sentencing held April 11, 2000 (R. 45 -47) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Vonn, 122S.Q. 1043(2002) 20 
STATE CASES 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) 20 
Salazarv. Warden, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993) 14, 19 
State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1994) 19 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998) 12 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 2, 14, 19, 20, 21 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992) 19 
State v. Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108 19 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 19, 22, 24 
State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,26P.3d203 2, 11. 17, 18 
State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115 3 
State v. Ostler,200\ UT68,31 P.3d 528 10 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) 10 
State v. Ross, 95\ P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997) 18 
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222 9, 16, 18, 19,20 
State v Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 19 
State v. Visser, 1999 UT App 19, 973 P.2d 998 18 
in 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242 15, 16, 18, 19.20 
State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982) 22 
Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1988) 13, 14 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 21 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2000) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(1988) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2000) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 (1998) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(1994) 3, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 11, 12, 19,21 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000340-CA 
vs. 
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions entered upon guilty pleas to child abuse, a 
second degree felony, and child abuse, a class A misdemeanor, both in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (2000), and assault, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000), in the Fifth Judicial Distnct, Iron 
County, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
1 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea where (a) defendant's first challenge to the plea did not 
adequately identify the alleged error and (b) his second challenge had neither 
factual nor legal support? 
"The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings of 
fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 14, 
26 P 3d 203. 
2. Has defendant established that the trial court obviously violated rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking defendant's plea and that, but for those 
violations, defendant would not have pled guilty? 
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (1) an 
error occurred; (u) the error was obvious; and (in) the error was harmful. State v 
Dunn, 850 P 2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) If any one of these elements is missing, 
there is no plain error. Id. at 1209. 
3 May this court address defendant's claim that the trial court improperly 
denied him a continuance and, without adequate warning, forced him to represent 
himself at sentencing, where no record evidence supports the claim9 
2 
Where there is no record to indicate otherwise, a reviewing court presumes 
the correctness of the proceedings below. See State v Mead, 2001 UT 58,1f 48, 27 
P 3d 1115 Absent record evidence to support a contention of error, the reviewing 
court does not address it. Id. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (2000), 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000), and 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three counts of child abuse—a second degree 
felony and two class A misdemeanors—in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
109 (2000). R. 1-4. He was also charged with commission of domestic violence in 
the presence of a child, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-109.1 (1998); assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000); and making a threat against life or property, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107 (1988). R. 1-4. 
Defendant pled guilty to one count each of child abuse, a second degree 
felony; child abuse, a class A misdemeanor; and assault, a class B misdemeanor. 
R. 25. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to file an amended 
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information charging only those counts and to forego filing additional charges based 
on statements defendant allegedly made threatening his children should they testify 
against him. R. 31-32. In connection with his plea, defendant executed a statement 
which included a paragraph describing each of the rights detailed in rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 29-35. The paragraph detailing defendant's right 
to a trial advised him of his right to a jury trial or, should he elect to waive that 
right, to a trial by the court. R. 34. The paragraph did not include the phrases 
"speedy trial" and "impartial jury." Id The statement also advised defendant that a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea had to be made within thirty days of the entry of 
the plea and would be granted only upon a showing of good cause. R. 32. 
Defendant was represented at the March 8, 2000 plea-taking by public 
defender Dale W. Sessions. R. 25. Sentencing was set for April 11, 2000. Id On 
April 10, 2000, D. Bruce Oliver entered an appearance of counsel and filed a 
motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea. R. 38-40. In his memorandum in 
support of the motion to withdraw, Mr. Oliver alleged that the plea had been taken 
in violation of rule 11, stating that "there are two significant departures from 
procedures which have been used by the courts to ensure a person due process 
and[/]or equal protection under the law " R. 43. He did not indicate what those 
departures were. He further alleged that the defendant had not been advised of the 
time limits for withdrawing his guilty plea. Id 
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Although Mr. Oliver entered an appearance, Mr. Sessions did not move to 
withdraw. Sentencing was held on April 11, 2000, with Mr. Sessions, but not Mr. 
Oliver, present. R. 45-47. The minutes note that Mr. Sessions had received Mr. 
Oliver's paperwork. Id. at 46. The minutes do not state whether argument was 
held on the motion to withdraw. Id. The minutes, together with other record 
documents, do indicate that the court denied the motion to withdraw because (1) 
defendant had not shown good cause and (2) the motion was untimely. R. 46, 48-
53. 
The minutes also show that defendant asked to represent himself and that the 
court released Mr. Sessions as counsel, but asked him to remain to assist defendant. 
R. 46. Defendant has not brought up a transcript of the sentencing hearing on 
appeal. The record therefore does not indicate the nature of the colloquy that 
occurred in connection with defendant's decision to represent himself. 
The court also asked defendant whether he would like to go forward on an 
order to show cause in a 1996 case (apparently a distribution of marijuana case 
where defendant was sentenced to supervised probation) or whether he would prefer 
to wait for Mr. Oliver to represent him. Id.; see also PSI at 1, 7. Defendant stated 
that he would like Mr. Oliver to assist with the order to show cause. R. 46. The 
court observed that the 1996 case could be continued, but that this case would go 
forward. Id. The minutes do not indicate that defendant moved for a continuance 
in this case. Id. No motion for a continuance is included elsewhere in the record. 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate pnson term of one-to-fifteen 
years. Id. at 45. The trial court filed its judgment, sentence, and commitment on 
Apnl 17, 2000. Defendant timely appealed—once through Mr. Oliver on Apnl 20, 
2000; once pro se on Apnl 26, 2000; and once through public defender Floyd W. 
Holm on Apnl 28, 2000. R. 59, 62, 64. In a document also dated Apnl 28, 2000, 
Mr. Sessions withdrew and Mr. Holm entered his appearance as "Public Defender 
Appointee." R. 65. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As defendant pled guilty and no trial was held, the statement of the facts is 
taken from the "Official Version of the Offense" and other information in the PSI. 
On January 7, 2000, defendant, who was angry with his dying 85-pound wife, 
repeatedly punched her in the stomach with a closed fist. PSI at 2-4, 10. When 
defendant's eleven-year-old son heard his mother screaming for help, he tried to 
stop defendant and give his mother some Ibuprofen and some wine. Id. Defendant 
then grabbed the boy by the neck and tned to choke him, telling the boy not to 
touch the Ibuprofen or the wine. Id. Defendant said, "[Djon't touch that or I'll 
break vour hands." Id. at 4. A friend of the child observed the incident and 
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corroborated the boy's account. Id. Defendant's wife died the following day. Id 
at 2. 
This incident was only one in defendant's long history of physically abusing 
his wife and children. Id at 1-5, 9-10. Two other incidents are relevant to this 
case. During the year preceding the January 2000 beating of his dying wife, 
defendant got drunk, heated a knife on the stove, and placed it in his fifteen-year-
old daughter's pierced and infected belly button. Id. at 3. He characterized this act 
as an attempt "to cauterize it." Id. While picking his daughter up at a football 
game that same year, defendant backhanded her across the face approximately ten 
times, blackening two of her eyes. Id. In addition, defendant's wife left a journal 
with entries from 1991 through 1994, descnbmg how defendant repeatedly beat her. 
Id. at 9-10. 
On approximately February 4, 2000, an Adult Probation and Parole 
investigator conducted a field visit at defendant's residence in connection with 
defendant's supervised probation. Id. at 2. Defendant had been drinking alcohol, 
in violation of his parole, and was taken into custody. Id. At the time of 
defendant's arrest, defendant's son told a police officer about the incident the day 
before his mother's death. Id. The children were subsequently interviewed and 
gave additional details about defendant's abuse. Id. The children both indicated 
that they are afraid of their father. Id. at 3-4. 
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Following his arrest, defendant threatened to retaliate against his children 
based on his belief that they were responsible for his incarceration Id at 14 
Defendant apparently also threatened his children with harm should they testify 
against him See R. 31-32. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea Defendant argued that the plea was not taken pursuant 
to rule 11, Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure Defendant, did not, however explain 
why the plea violated rule 11 Defendant also argued the trial court should have 
granted his motion to withdraw because the court had not informed him of the 30-
day time limit within which to make the motion Failure to advise a defendant of 
the time limits for filing a motion to withdraw is not a ground for setting aside a 
plea In any case, the record demonstrates that the trial court did, in fact, advise 
defendant of the 30-day limit. 
The trial court did not plainly err when it informed defendant of his right to a 
jury trial, but failed to specify that he had a right to a speedy trial before an 
impartial jury. Where defendant neither objected at the plea-taking nor raised the 
claim in the context of his motion to withdraw, his claim is not properly before this 
Court In any case, failure to use the words speedx and impartial was not error 
The trial court's colloquy sufficed to ensure that defendant knew of his rights and 
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understood the consequences of his decision to plead guilty In addition, defendant 
had an extensive criminal history Defendant's experience in the courts in 
connection with these convictions sufficed to communicate his rule 11 rights 
Even if error occurred, it was not obvious Defendant's relies on State v 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P 3d 1222, for his hyper-technical reading of 
rule 11 This Court's opinion in Tarnawiecki was filed after defendant's plea-
taking and after the court denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Tarnauiecki 
therefore could not have guided the tnal court Moreover, Tarnawiecki's 
precedential value is undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
Furthermore, any error was harmless Defendant has not demonstrated that he 
would not have pled guilty, but for the tnal court's failure to specify his nght to a 
speedy tnal before an impartial jury. 
Finally, the record does not support defendant's allegation that the tnal court 
denied his motion for a continuance to secure the presence of appointed counsel at 
sentencing Similarly, no record evidence supports his allegation that the tnal court 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA WHERE DEFENDANT'S FIRST CHALLENGE TO THE PLEA 
DID NOT ADEQUATELY IDENTIFY THE ALLEGED ERROR AND 
HIS SECOND CHALLENGE HAD NEITHER FACTUAL NOR LEGAL 
SUPPORT 
Defendant claims that the tnal court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Br Aplt. at 17, 19. The trial court, however, 
properly denied the motion where (a) defendant's first challenge to the plea did not 
specify the error claimed and (b) his second challenge had neither factual nor legal 
support. 
The tnal court denied defendant's motion to withdraw "on the grounds set 
forth in the State's response." R. 53. The State argued below, as it does now on 
appeal, that defendant had not articulated his first challenge and that his second 
challenge was without legal or factual basis. R. 50-51 (Response to Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea).1 Defendant therefore had not "show[n] 'good cause' to set 
aside his guilty plea." Id. at 51. 
The State also argued that defendant's motion was untimely. Defendant's motion 
was untimely under then-controlling precedent requinng that defendant make his motion 
within thirty davs following the plea-taking. See State v Price, 837 P 2d 578 (Utah App 
1992) (overruled bx State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, «1 11, 31 P 3d 528). Defendant's motion 
would apparently be timely, however, ider precedent established in the mtenm. See 
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, t 11, holding tha~ \ie 30-day limitation runs from the date of final 
judgment. 
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A. Defendant did not adequately identify his first claim of error 
On the day before sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, together with a supporting memorandum. R. 39-44. The motion stated that 
"defendant was not aware of his rights at the time of the entry of his plea, nor did 
he realize the ramifications of the entry of his guilty plea." R. 40. The motion 
stated that "[defendant's counsel believes that the plea was not taken pursuant to 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, and 
that it violated defendant's due process and equal protection rights." Id It did not, 
however, suggest how the plea violated rule 11, due process, or equal protection 
The supporting memorandum made two arguments. Defendant first argued 
that a judge must "ensure that the plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily" and 
that failure to comply with rule 11 is good cause for the withdrawal of a plea. Id 
at 43-44. Defendant quoted rule 11(e) and then stated: "In the case at bar, there are 
two significant departures from procedures which have been used by the courts to 
ensure a person due process and[/]or equal protection under the law." Id at 43 
The memorandum did not, however, specify what "significant departures" had 
occurred. The record does not indicate any oral argument on the motion. Id 
This Court reviews a tnal court's denial of a motion to withdraw for an abuse 
of discretion State v Martinez, 2001 LT 12, <! 14, 26 P 3d 203. Where defendant 
did not specify the basis for his challenge, the tnal court could not reasonably have 
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been expected to ferret out unspecified errors in the plea colloquy, including the 
errors defendant now claims on appeal. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 
(Utah App. 1998) (grounds claimed "must be specific enough to give the trial court 
notice of the very error of which counsel complains"). The trial court properly 
rejected defendant's claim of unspecified errors. 
B. Defendant's second challenge had neither factual nor legal support. 
Defendant next argued that "[t]he second possible departure from Rule 11 in 
this case is that at no time was the defendant advised of the time limits for 
withdrawing his guilty plea." R. 43. The record, however, indicates that defendant 
was advised of the 30-day limit in the statement he executed in connection with his 
plea. See R. 32. The trial court established that defendant had read and initialed 
the paragraphs of the statement, including paragraph 10, which detailed the time 
limit. R. 71:3. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court 
failed to inform him of the time limits. 
Further, rule ll(8)(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides 
that c'[f]ailure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be 
the ground for extending the time to make a motion." Even had the trial court 
failed to inform defendant of the time limits, that failure would not have constituted 
good cause for setting aside his plea. 
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In sum, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR WHEN IT INFORMED 
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY, BUT DID NOT 
USE THE MODIFIERS SPEEDY BEFORE TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL 
BEFORE JURY 
A. Defendant's claim is not properly before this Court. 
Defendant claims on appeal that the tnal court plainly erred because, while it 
advised defendant of his right to a jury trial, it did not expressly state that he was 
entitled to a speedy tnal before an impartial jury'. Br. Aplt. at 14-17. Defendant 
argues that this Court should hear his claim, even though he did not object at the 
plea-taking and did not raise the claim in his subsequent motion to withdraw. 
Utah precedent permits a defendant to challenge his guilty plea in two ways: 
either on direct appeal or by collateral attack. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344 
(Utah App. 1988). If the challenge is made on direct appeal, the challenge "must 
be in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be 
appealed." Id. If the challenge to the guilty plea is made collaterally, the challenge 
may be to the plea itself, and need not challenge the denial of a motion to 
withdraw. Id. at 344-345. 
Defendant in this case filed a motion to withdraw. R. 39-40. That motion, 
however, did not claim the errors now alleged on appeal. Defendant does not 
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therefore challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw. Rather, he directly 
challenges the plea itself, asking this Court to review the record of the plea-taking 
for errors not specified in the motion to withdraw. This is an impermissible route 
to appellate review. See Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d at 341. This court should 
therefore decline to address defendant's claim on appeal.2 
B. Assuming arguendo that defendant's claim is properly before this court, 
defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court obviously violated 
rule 11 and that, but for those violations, defendant would not have pled 
guilty. 
Assuming arguendo that defendant's plain error claim is properly before this 
Court, it nevertheless lacks merit. Defendant claims that the trial court committed 
plain error because it failed to inform defendant of "the right to a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury," as required by rule 11(e)(3). Br. Aplt. at 14. To 
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) an error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is 
no plain error. Id. at 1209. Defendant cannot demonstrate error, obviousness, or 
harm. His claim therefore fails. 
:If defendant believes that the trial court's failure to inform him of his right to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury made his plea involuntary, he is not without remedy. 
See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 & n. 6 (Utah 1993) (conviction on the basis of 
,4guilty plea [that] was in fact not knowing and voluntary" constitutes deprivation of 
constitutional right, addressable on collateral review). 
14 
1. No error occurred. 
No error occurred. The trial court complied with the mandates of rule 11. 
Under rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not 
accept a plea of guilty before making certain findings, most of which involve the 
defendant's having been advised of his constitutional rights. Thus, "the trial court 
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and establish on the record that defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in Visser). Utah precedent has "described 
the court's duty in this regard as a duty of strict compliance." Id. (citing State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)). "Strict compliance, however, does not 
mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. (citing State v. 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1993); State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 
1991)). On the contrary, "the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that 
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of 
their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or 
undermined by formalistic ritual." Id. 
Defendant's rights were laid out in detail in the statement he made in 
connection with his plea. R. 29-35. The trial court ascertained that defendant had 
read and signed every paragraph of the statement. R. 51. The trial court thereby 
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informed defendant that he had a right to "a tnal by jury" and that, in connection 
with that nght, 
he would have the nght to confront the witnesses against him, 
he had the nght to have witnesses subpoenaed to testify in his behalf; 
• he could, if he so chose, testify in his own behalf; and 
he could, however, choose not to testify, and the jury would be instructed that 
this could "not be held against [him]". 
R. 34; see also Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 12 (findings may be based on plea affidavit) 
The tnal court also instructed defendant that the State must prove every element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury verdict must be unanimous 
R. 34. Further, the tnal court told him that by entenng a plea, he would waive his 
tnal nghts. R. 33. 
This painstaking enumeration of defendant's nghts sufficed to meet the 
requirements of rule 11(e)(3). The tnal court's omission of the words speedy and 
impartial did not defeat the substantive goal of rule 11. The tnal court's procedure 
was sufficient to ensure that defendant knew of his nghts and understood the basic 
consequences of his decision to plead guilty To require that the tnal court use the 
words speedy, impartial, or, for that matter, public, would be to overshadow and 
undermine the substantive goal by imposing "formahstic ntual." 
Defendant argues that State v Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P 3d 1222, 
mandates the use of the terms. See Br Aplt at 16 Tarnawiecki does appear to 
require the terms. Tarnawiecki's requirements, however, appear inconsistent with 
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subsequent precedent established by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Martinez, 
2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203. In Martinez, the defendant moved in the district court to 
withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 1[ 11. 
The district court denied the motion, and Martinez appealed. Id. at U 13. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had "strictly complied with 
the constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of [Martinez's] guilty plea," 
including the mandates of rule 11. Id. at f 26. The Court reasoned that "strict 
compliance creates a presumption that the plea was voluntary" and affirmed. Id. at 
f 21. The opinion observed, by way of background, that defendant understood his 
rights, among them, "the right to a jury trial and that the matter was set for trial." 
Id. at f 4. In its analysis of defendant's rule 11 challenge, the Court again 
enumerated the rights that defendant acknowledged and understood, among them, 
"the right to a jury trial." Id. at f 23. Although nothing in the case suggested that 
the trial court had used the terms impartial and speedy, the Court nonetheless held 
that the colloquy "strictly complied" with rule 11. Martinez therefore is 
inconsistent with the decision in Tarnaxviecki and, by implication, overrules it. 
Finally, defendant had an extensive criminal history, including several 
convictions for theft by receiving stolen property and one conviction for distribution 
of marijuana. See PSI at 6-7. Defendant's experience in the courts in connection 
with these convictions must have "communicated [defendant's rights] at least as 
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much as would the mere oral recitation of the "right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury " See State v Visser. 2000 UT 88, f^ 13, 22 P 3d 1242 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (holding that personal trial experience may suffice to 
communicate certain rule 11 rights). 
2. Error, if any, was not obvious. 
Even if error occurred, it was not obvious Error is not obvious "where there 
is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court " State v Ross, 951 P 2d 236, 
239 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant's complaint rests on a hyper-technical reading of 
rule 11. Defendant cites only to State v Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 
1222, for his reading of the rule. The decision of this Court in Tarnawiecki was 
filed June 15, 2000, following defendant's plea-taking and after the trial court had 
denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Therefore, Tarnawiecki could not have 
guided the trial court.3 
Further, the precedential value of the portion of Tarnawiecki mandating the 
use of the terms "speedy" and "public" has been undermined by Martinez, 2001 UT 
12, and Visser, 2000 UT 88, both decided after Tarnawiecki. 
The Tarnawiecki court held that the failure to inform a defendant of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury constituted plain error 
Tarnawiecki relied on State v Visser, 1999 LT App 19, 973 P 2d 998, which was 
subsequently reversed on certioran review See State \ Visser, 2000 UT 88, 22 P 3d 
1242 
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3. Error, if any, was not harmful. 
To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that the error was 
harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. While noncompliance with rule 11 may 
establish error and, in some cases, even obvious error, it does not necessarily 
establish prejudice. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, If 15 ("it is difficult to see 
how the court's failure in this case to discuss the possibility that defendant may 
serve no time and incur no fine [as required by rule 11(e)(5)] would result in a 
harmful error").4 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of 
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citing State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989); State v Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 
(Utah App. 1994); State v. Ellifiitz. 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)). A 
defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must 
show " ;a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
4
 A "voluntary and knowing" guilty plea does not require stnct compliance with 
rule 11 to be constitutionally sound under either the federal or state constitution. See 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993). "Rule 11 is a device for 
protecting the right [of voluntariness] but the scope of Rule 11 does not equal the more 
limited scope of the constitutional right." Id at 992 (quotation and citation omitted). 
Instead, compliance with rule 11 merely "creates a presumption that the plea was 
voluntarily entered." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, U 11, 1 P 3d 1108. And while the 
"substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty," that goal "should not 
be overshadowed or undermined by formahstic ritual." Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 1 11. 
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pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Parsons v Barnes, 871 
P 2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v Lockhart. 474 U S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
Thus, a defendant attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must demonstrate 
that but for the tnal court's omissions, he would not have pleaded guilty but would 
have insisted on going to tnal. He must establish that an obvious error so infected 
the plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying 
validity, because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf Dunn, 850 P 2d 
at 1208-09; Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffl[ 11-14 
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, 
the test for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional 
plain error analysis.5 
The United States Supreme Court, addressing violations of rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has held that a defendant who first claims a 
rule 11 violation on appeal must meet the plain error standard. United States v 
Vonn, 122 S Ct. 1043, 1046 (2002). As part of his responsibility to meet this 
burden, a defendant must demonstrate "that his 'substantial rights' were affected " 
"The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tamawiecki by presuming 
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tamawiecki of her nght to a speedy tnal before an 
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful " Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 
1| 18. Tamawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the tnal court's 
violations of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty Otherwise, omission of the words 
speedy and impartial, like the failure to advise Tamawiecki of her minimum possible 
sentence as required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless. 
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Id. at 1048. Moreover, "because relief on plain-error review is in the discretion of 
the reviewing court, a defendant has the further burden to persuade the court that 
the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Rule 11's federal counterpart includes a subsection (h) entitled "Harmless 
Error/' Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded." This provision "rejects the extreme sanction of automatic reversal." 
Advisory Committee Note (1983 amendment). 
Although Utah's rule 11 contains no harmless error provision, its plain error 
analysis does. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. The United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Vonn is thus a useful guide to the application of harmless error analysis 
in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 violation was harmful, a defendant 
must demonstrate that the errors significantly influenced or materially affected his 
decision to plead guilty. This is another way of saying that, but for the errors, he 
would not have pled guilty. 
Defendant made no record in the trial court of why he decided to plead guilty 
and how the court's omissions materially affected that decision. He did not testify 
that he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty had he only known he 
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was entitled to a speedy tnal by an impartial jury The record does not demonstrate 
prejudice 
III. 
THIS COURT MAY NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED HIM A 
CONTINUANCE AND, WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING, 
FORCED HIM TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AT SENTENCING, 
WHERE NO RECORD EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CLAIM 
Defendant apparently elected to represent himself at his sentencing hearing 
R 46 (Minutes, Sentencing) Defendant alleges that the tnal court denied his 
motion for a continuance that would have permitted him to secure the presence of 
retained counsel at his sentencing heanng. Br. Aplt. at 20. Defendant further 
alleges that "the tnal court did not conduct the colloquy as required and therefore 
the record fails to show that [he] was advised of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self representation . . or that his choice was made with eyes open." Id at 25 
Defendant's allegations are without support in the record. This Court must 
therefore assume the regularity of the proceedings in the tnal court. See State v 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11 "When a defendant predicates error to [a reviewing 
court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a 
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine " State v 
Wulffenstein, 657 P 2d 289, 293 (Utah 1( -2) The reviewing court u «mply cannot 
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rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported 
by the record." Id. 
Defendant has not included a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the record 
on appeal. The pleadings volume contains the only record evidence of that hearing. 
See R. 45-47 (Minutes, Sentencing), 55-57 (Judgment, Sentence, Commitment). 
The minutes of the proceeding indicate that defendant asked to represent himself 
and that the court released his attorney, Dale Sessions, as counsel. R. 46. The 
minutes do not further detail the colloquy that attended the release of counsel 
except to indicate that the court asked Mr. Sessions to remain to assist defendant 
should he need counsel for the sentencing proceeding. Id. 
Further, the minutes do not indicate that defendant requested a continuance to 
secure the assistance of retained counsel for the sentencing hearing. See id. The 
minutes do indicate that the trial judge asked defendant if he would like to postpone 
proceedings on an order to show cause in a 1996 case. Id. When defendant 
answered that he would like to have counsel's assistance in that case, the trial judge 
continued it. Id. The contrasting absence of any minute entry detailing either a 
motion to continue or a ruling on that motion suggests that no motion was made. 
In any case, absent a transcript of the sentencing proceeding, the record does 
not support defendant's allegations that he requested and was denied a continuance 
or that the he was not fairly advised of the dangers of self representation. Absent 
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record evidence to the contrary, this Court must "assume the regularity of 
proceedings below." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 11. This Court therefore 
may not address defendant's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical 
condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a serious 
physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously impairs 
the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or 
which involves a substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or 
causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon 
the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601: 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the 
same time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe developmental 
delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation is successful 
following the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the 
child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or custody of 
such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of such 
child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as 
follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means 
alone through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an 
established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal guardian is a member or 
adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed an offense under this section. 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/-code/TITLE76/htm/76_05019.htm 3 20 02 
Amended b\ Chapter 125. 2000 General Session 
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76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another: 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another: 
or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or \iolence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injur}' to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another: or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Amended by Chapter 170, 2000 General Session 
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77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. (1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made 
within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Amended by Chapter 16, 1994 General Session 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 3, 2000) 
THE COURT: We'll go back to the top of the calendar. 














DOXEY: Yes, your Honor. 
COURT: Does this go forward? 
DOXEY: We need to make one quick change, your 
COURT: All right. 
DOXEY: Your Honor, I think the defendant will 
The nature of the agreement, your Honor, is 
Dean is going to plead guilty to Counts I, III and V. 
is child abuse, a second-degree felony. Count III is 
use, a Class A misdemeanor, and Count V is assault, a 
misdemeanor. 
In addition — or in exchange for his pleas, the Stat* 
will move to 








dismiss the remaining charges, and has agreed not 
charges of witness tampering arising from alleged 
to the Children. 
THE COURT: First of all, does he want to waive nis 
a preliminary hearing"1 
MR. 
THE 
SESSIONS: He does. 
COURT: He's held over for arraignment at this 
have a statement of the defendant regarding plea 


























initials by < 
MR. 
I would like 
agreement. 
THE 




£ the 16 paragraphs. 
SESSIONS: Your Honor, 
to explain a couple o 
COURT 
ad. 
. I see a lot of 
SESSIONS: Okay, let's 
first time is paragraph 9. There 
the word coersion. It is stricken 




while you're reviewing that 
f things about this 
interlineation there on the 
see, the first change, the 
was a word written above 
and initialed by me and my 
it. 
SESSIONS: Likewise, on paragraph 16 there was an 
Information included at the bottom 
been lined through 
client's initials, 
THE 





of the document, which has 
It has my initials and my 
for the Court to disregard it as well. 





Did you place 











And are you in 
regarding what' 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. What is 
are these your initials by 
them there after you first 
agreement with what your 
s written here, handwriting? 
your plea to Count I, child 
abuse, sex abuse? 
MR. DEAN: Guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Count III, child abuse, a Class A second-
degree misdemeanor? 
MR. DEAN: Guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Count V, assault, a Class B misdemeanor? 
MR. DEAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. The remaining counts are all 
dismissed. Factual basis? 
MR. DOXEY: Yes, your Honor. During 1999 the State's 
evidence is the defendant heated up a knife, and placed it on 
his daughter's stomach and burned her. She still has a scar as 
a result of this. Then on January 7*h, 2000 the defendant beat 
up his wife on the day before she died* She was on her death 
bed. That is the allegation of the assault, and then his son 
attempted to render aid to his mother, he grabbed his son by 
the tnrcat and choked him. That is the allegation for the 
child abuse. 
THE COURT: Okay. I assume that the wife's death was 
not -- we won't be looking at a murder case? 
MR. DOXEY: It's not a muraer case, your Honor. He 
ceat ~er up. She was dying of a kidney or a liver disease. 
THE COURT: Anything you want to add to or dispute tnat 
summary? 
MR. SESSIONS: While my client does not agree with the 
State's evidence, he understands that that is the State's 
evidence, and that they would be aole to produce that evidence. 
THE COURT: Do you engage in any alcohol or drugs, 
including any prescription medication from a doctor that would 
affect your judgment at this time? 
MR. DEAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Set this for sentencing with a pre-sentence 
report. We'll go with April llrn at 1:30 for the sentencing. 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, there is a couple of other 
matters I'd like the Court to take into consideration on this 
case. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. DOXEY: Now that he's pled guilty to three counts, 
the remainder has been dismissed, there are a few issues. He 
was originally brought before the Court on a no-bail warrant. 
He'd like to have that removed, or recalled from the other 
case, and I apologize I don't have a number, but there is 
another case with that hold. 
THE COURT: That's one that he's on supervised 
probation? 
MR. SESSIONS: Yes. Then the other issue is in this 
particular case I believe bail has ceen set at $2,500, and with 
these cnanges, he — and the understanding that he would help 
cooperate, and he has assured me that he will cooperate with 
the CSI in preparation, he would like to be released, be able 
-6-
to make arrangements to move out of his home. He's aware of 
that. So he would at least ask the Court to reduce bail to 
a $5,000 bond, so that he can secure a bond and be released 
between now and April 11th to make those arrangements. 
THE COURT: State's position? 
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, the State opposes the motion 
to reduce the bail and to lift the no-bail hold on him. 
For the record, your Honor, in his previous cases, 
case No. 961500370, a no-bail warrant — a no-bail order, 
rather, was placed on him for numerous reasons. First, that 
he nas continued to violate his probation and disregard many 
of the conditions of his probation. 
Secondly, your Honor, the crimes which he has just 
pled guilty to are extremely violent. He has perpetrated 
against his two children and his deceased wife. Since the 
investigation has begun, Mr. Dean has threatened to kill his 
children if they testify against him. 
We believe, your Honor, there's a substantial risk of 
Mr. Dean hurting his children. Right now they have to have 
protective custody, but we believe there's a substantial risk 
of -- we are in possession, your Honor, of a journal from his 
wife that outline the defendant's actions throughout the year. 
THE COURT: I don't deny the fact that he's been on, 
then, for no other reason he's on probation with the Court 
already, supervised, and his many serious offenses which he's 
-7 
1 I ]ust pled guilty, I can't imagine that he wouldn't receive at 
2 least as many days in jail as are between now and sentencing. 
3 The statute allows me to after a conviction, which has ]ust 
4 occurred, to commit a person to jail pending sentencing, so 
5 that's what I'm doing. 
6 MR. DOXEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
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rN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
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WALLACE WAYNE DEAN 
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STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT 
REGARDLNG PLEA BARGAIN, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, and 
ORDER 
Criminal No 001500153 
Judge ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN 
I, WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, the above-named Defendant, under oath, hereby 
acknowledge that I have entered a plea of "guilty" to the offense(s) of Child Abuse (Count I), a 
Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse (Count III), Class A Misdemeanor, and Assault (Count V) a 
Class B Misdemeanor as contained in the original Information on file against me in the above-
entitled Court, a copy of which I have received and read, and I understand the nature of the elements 
of the offense for which I am pleading "guilty " I further understand the charge to which this plea 
of "guilty" is entered is a Second-Degree Felonv, a Class A Misdemeanor, and a Class B 
Misdemeanor and that I am entering such a plea voluntarily and of my own free will, after contemns 
with my* Attorney, Dale Sessions, and with a knowledge and understanding of the following tacts 
j ' ! j \ I know that I have constitutional rights under the Constitutions ot L tah and the I nited 
States to plead not guilty and to have a jury tnal upon the charge to which I have entered a plea o( 
guilty, or to a tnal by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by Dale Sessions as my attorney. 
\ J l/% I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the charge, I have a right to confront 
the witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in my presence and before the Court 
and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I 
have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify in Court on my 
behalf and that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, and that if I choose 
not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be held against me if I choose to have the 
jury so instructed. 
I } 1l t/J*' * know that if I were to have a trial that the State must prove each and every element 
of the crime charged to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would 
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, whether 
it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
f \ irLr>- I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the Unite states that 1 have a 
right against self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify 
in Court upon trial unless I choose to do so. 
, N i\l U 5. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted bv a jurv 
or by the Court that I would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court 
of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal. 
i > 1/V'fe' * ' c n o w l^a t {^ w* s^ t 0 c o n t e s t lhe charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty" 
and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before ajury, the verdict must 
be unanimous. I know and understand that by entering a plea of "guilty," I am waiving my 
constitutional rights as set out in the preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating 
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of "guilty" is entered. 
{ \ Jil jh> I know that under the laws of Utah the possible maximum sentence that can and mav 
be imposed upon my plea of "guilty" to the charge identified on page one of this Statement, and as 
set out in the Amended Information, is as follows: 
Count I: Child Abuse 
(A) a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of 510,000 dollars. 
Count III: Child Abuse 
(A) a term of 1 year in the Iron County Jail. 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of S2500 dollars. 
Count V: Assault 
(A) a term of six months in the Iron County Jail 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of S1,000 
I further understand that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon 
another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded "guilty," my plea in the 
3 
present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me I also know that [ ma\ be 
ordered byjhe Court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime. 
u).^4-
because of my "guilty" plea. VC^f? 
IAJ * ^ o. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of "guilty " does not mean that the Court 
will not impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made 
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead "guilty" or that it \\ ill be made lighter 
9 No threats/coerc^yn. or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me 
to plead "guilty," and no promises, except those contained herein, have been made to me 1 know 
that any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to what he or they believe the 
Court may do with respect to sentencing are not binding on the Court. 
V^ i V 4t). I know that under the laws of Utah should I desire to move the Court to set aside my 
"guilty" plea entered in this case, I must do so within thirty (30) days of the entry of the pleas or mv 
nght to do so will be lost. I further understand that a plea of "guilty" may be withdrawn only upon 
a showing of good cause and with permission of the Court. 
\ \\J H. No promises of any kiofliiave been made to induce me to plead "suilty" except that 
I have been told that if I do plead yguifty/*rlthg_.Sttite of- Utah hni nprccA tft-Ule-an-Amended 
[utasmattefl therein charging me with Child Abuse, a Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse a Class 
A Misdemeanor, and Assault a Class B Misdemeanor as opposed to the original charge(s) ot Child 
Abuse, a second-degree felony, Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor Child Abuse, a class A 
misdemeanor, Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a class A 
Misdemeanor, Assault a class B Misdemenaor and Threat Against Life or Property, a Class B 
Misdemeanor I also understand that if I plead guilty as set forth above, the State agrees to not file 
additional charges for allegedly threatening my children if they testified against me. I am also d\\ are 
that the State will recommend the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Repon. No other 
promises have been made. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court 
and may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
U r3 I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
\ hj*^ I am J) 0 years of age, I have attended school through the / / grade, and I can 
read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the influence 
of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants. 
Olfti ' I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
mv plea-.-. 
VJ 16. I have discussed the contents ot this Statement with my Attorney, and ask the Court 
to accept my plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in this Statement because during 1999 I did. 
while in an intoxicated state, intentionally and knowingly burn my daughter with a knife that had 
|'V +21*' UKJJ* 
been he^eji^ip on the stove, and during on or about January 7, 2000,1 did grab my son b> the neck 
uQ 
and choked him to prevent him from giving Ibuprofen to my deceased wife, and that on that same 
date, I did unlawfully hit my wife. These acts occurred in Iron County, State of Utah. 
DATED Y day of March, 2000 
WALLACE WAYttE DEAN 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, the Defendant named abov e 
and I know she has read the Statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and 
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropnate investigation, the elements of the cnme 
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing Statement. 
are accurate and true. 
At torneys Defet 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against WrALL ACE W A Y\ E 
DEAN, Defendant. I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations, 
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense are true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercions 
oc , ^ 
to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in this Statement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the Defendant for the offense for which the 
plea is entered and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. 
DAVID E. DOXEY 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea 
Bargain and the foregoing Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of "guilty" 
is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that Defendant WALLACE WAYNE DEAN's 
plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before me this o day of March, 2000. 
ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 




D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
O J ^ . 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 001500153 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, 
and hereby moves this Court for a withdrawal of his Guilty Plea as the defendant was not 
aware of his rights at the time of the entry of his plea, nor did he realize the ramificauons of 
the entry of his guilty plea. Based upon information and belief. Defendant's counsel believes 
that the plea was not taken pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1953, as amended) constitutes a violation of due process and deprived 
the defendant equal protection. 
Said motion is filed pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 12, 11, 24, and 27 of the Utah State 
G U ;<j 
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Constitution, and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Further, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities is in support 
of said motion and is incorporated herein and annexed hereto by this reference. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10* day of 
April, 2000. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OFFAXING/MAILINC. 
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (43S) 586-2737 
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: Scott M. Bums, IRON COUNTY ATTORNEYS 
OFFICE, 97 North Main, Suite #1, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Dated this 8th day of July, 1998. 
* * * *Jkj**m* 
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Addendum E 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
1 f, 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Case No, 001500153 
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, 
and hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of his Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
At the time a plea of guilty or no contest is entered in any matter a judge has the 
duty to ensure that the plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily. 
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting a 
J J 4 \ 
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guilty or no contest plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for die withdrawal of 
that plea. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
Rule 11 of the Utah rules of criminal Procedure provides as follows: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial 
jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, 
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, 
these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea 
is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
In the case at bar, there are two significant departures from procedures which 
have been used by the courts to ensure a person due process and or equal protecaon under the 
law. 
POINT n. 
The second possible departure from Rule 11 in this case is that at no time was 
the defendant advised of the time limits for withdrawing his guilty plea. Immediately upon his 
entry the Court only informed the defendant that he was being referred to Adult Probation & 
2 
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Parole for a pre-sentence investigation. This is a clear violauon of Rule 11(e). Subsecaon 
(e)(7) provides: 
The court. . . may not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant has 
been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea . . . . 
This was not done in this case. 
POINT PL 
The defendant reserves the right to amend his points and may raise additional 
points pertaining to Rule 11 violations that may become available to him upon review of the 
transcript of the taking of the guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should allow Mr. Dean to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed in 
the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10* day of 
April, 2000. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
39 39?d • i^^ j x i l A T i n "3«->nvier rr 
CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MATT INC. 
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 586-2737 
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUTLTY PLEA, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: Scott M. 
Burns, IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 97 North Main, Suite #1, P.O. Box 428, 
Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Dated this 10* day of April, 2000. 
)aL/^ /?&*-* 
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Addendum F 
FILED 
APR 1 1 2000 
8th DISTRICT COURT 
IRON OOUNTY 
DEPUTY CLIRK _ 
DAVID E.DOXEY (7506) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 42 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Facsimile: (435) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY. 
STATE OF UTAH 





MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA / RESPONSE 
TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA 
CASE NO. 001500153 
JUDGE ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE 
COMES NOW the State of Utah by and through Deputy Iron County Attorney David E. 
Doxey, and hereby moves this court to strike the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea filed by D. 
Bruce Oliver. Alternatively, the State responds to the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
D. Bruce Oliver is not the defendant's attorney. To date, only Dale Sessions has entered 
his appearance for and on behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Oliver has not filed an Appearance of 
Counsel in the above-entitled matter. Therefore, the State moves this court to strike the 
1 
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unsupported Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
A. A Case of Buyer's Remorse-No "Good Cause" to Set Aside the Defendant's 
Guilty Plea. 
At the heart of the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is a case of buyers 
remorse. The Defendant cannot show ''good cause" to set aside his guilty plea as required by 
Utah Code §77-13-6. Additionally, the Defendant cannot claim that his constitutional or Rule 
11 rights have been violated.1 On March 8, 2000, the Defendant signed a Statement of the 
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain. Certificate of Counsel, and Order. That document explicitly 
set forth every constitutional and Rule 11 right of the defendant (including all of the rights 
complained of in Defendant's motion). The defendant read the document, signed every 
paragraph, and signed the signature line. The defendant was asked and responded that he 
entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly and after he had read and understood the document. 
The Defendant motion makes no claim that he was incapacitated or otherwise physically or 
mentally unable to enter his guilty plea. 
The Defendant's motion states that there are two significant departures from the proper 
procedure. The motion, however, fails to articulate the first claimed departure other than copying 
the whole of Rule 11. 
lSee. State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746. 748 (Utah 1993), State v. Truiillo-Martinez. 814 
P.2d 596. 599-600 (Utah 1991), State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988). 
0 n ' < -
The second claimed departure is that the court violated Rule 11(e) by not informing the 
defendant of the time period to set aside his guilty plea. Paragraph 10 of the aforementioned 
document, specifically sets forth these requisite time limits as stated in Utah Code §77-13-6. The 
defendant read and initialed paragraph 10. Furthermore, Rule 1 l(8)(f) specifically provides that 
"failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty...is not ground for setting the plea aside." Clearly, the motion states no basis to set aside 
the defendant's plea. 
Finally, it is no surprise that the Defendant filed his motion only after the Presentence 
Investigation Report came out. The Defendant's motion can only be seen as buyer's remorse as 
there is no legal or factual basis to set aside his plea, and his motion was only filed after he 
learned the presentence recommendation. 
B. Defendant's Motion is Time Barred. 
The Defendant did not file his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea until thirty-two days after 
he entered his guilty plea. The Defendant may not set aside his guilty plea, without stipulation of 
all parties, after thirty days have passed since he entered his plea. Utah Code §77-13-6. 
Therefore, the Defendant's motion is time barred. 
C. Rule 11 Sanctions 
As the motion fails to state one legitimate claim that the defendant's constitutional or 
Rule 11 rights were violated. The filing of the Defendant's motion merits Rule 11 sanctions. 
OOi.jr, 
against Mr. Oliver, for filing a frivolous motion. After reading the motion, one can only 
conclude that Mr. Oliver did nothing to reasonably research the facts surrounding the entry of the 
defendant's guilty plea. Nor did Mr. Oliver even allege that a particular constitutional right of 
the defendant was violated. Therefore, if there is a unreasonable delay in the proceedings, as a 
result of Mr. Oliver's motion, the court ought to assess sanctions against Mr. Oliver equal to the 
costs of the Defendant's extended commitment in the Iron County Jail 
Conclusion 
Mr. Oliver's motion is totally without merit. Mr. Oliver has not entered his appearance, 
and therefore, his motion should be stricken. Mr. Oliver has also not set forth one constitutional 
or Rule 11 basis to set aside Mr. Dean's guilty plea. Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Oliver should 
be ordered for filing the frivolous Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
DATED this 11 day of April, 2000 
David E. Doxey / / 
Deputy Iron County Attorney/ 
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CERTIFK 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid this 
, _
 J
 -.\d\ K.-f A p r i l 2000 to the following address: 
Dale Sessions 
Cedar r\v " r s r i - i r 
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Addendum < i 
Ll-TH DISTP1TT COURT- CEDAR COURT 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 




SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001500153 FS 
.Judge; ROBERT T\ BRAITKWP-
;~ace- April 11 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tammyc 
Prosecutor: DAVID E. DOXEY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DALE SESSIONS 
Ag e n c yi Fift h D i s t r ict Court 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 
Video 
Tape Number: 041100 Tape Count m. 
CHARGES 
1. :
 w rts-c-i >i£^.~^ - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/03/200: 
3. CHILD A3USE/NEGLECT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2C0C 
5. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 
6. 1HRZAT AGAINST LIFE/PROPERTY - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Dispcsizion: *, 3 J 0 8/2 0 0 0 Declined Pros ecu t ion 
r . e a 
5uiltv Plea 
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Case No: 001500153 
Date: Apr 11, 2000 
HEARING 
TAPE: 041100 COUNT: 1:33 p.m. 
On record. The Defendant is incarcerated. Mr. Sessions states ^e 
received paperwork from Bruce Oliver's office. The court: denies 
Mr. Oliver's motion. 
COUNT: 2:0 9 p 
Mr. Sessions states he has met with the Defendant, but the 
Defendant would like to represent himself in these matters 
Mr. Sessions is released by the court as counsel for tne 
Defendant; however, he is asked to help the Defendant in case tne 
Defendant needs counsel for these proceedings. 
COUNT: 2:10 p 
Mr. Doxey responds to the paperwork he received from Bruce Oliver 
Mr. Sessions asks the court questions regarding his representing 
the Defendant. Judge Braithwaite states his grounds for denying 
Mr. Oliver's motion. 
The court states the PSI refers to this case, as well as an older 
one Case #961500370. Judge Braithwaite asks the Defendant if re s^ 
ready to go forward on the allegations in Case #961500370, or if -e 
would like to have Bruce Oliver here. 
The Defendant would like Bruce Oliver here to help him on tne 
Order to Show Cause proceedings on Case #961500370. Judge 
Braithwaite states that the 96' case can be continued, as IC is net 
yet ready, but that this case will go forward today. 
COUNT: 2:21 p 
The Defendant responds to the PSI and the agencies 
recommendations. 
COUNT: 2:30 p 
Mr. Sessions makes comments regarding sentencing. 
COUNT: 2:38 p 
Mr. Doxey responds to the PSI and gives sentencing 
recommendations. 
COUNT: 2:42 p 
The court sentences the Defendant to 1-15 years in the Utan State 
Prison. The Defendant's other case #961500370 is re-ncticec for 
5-2-00 at 2:30 p.m. 
Page 2 
Case Moi 001500153 
Date: Apr 11, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant s conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the IRON County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utan State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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